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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, an obsessed fan shot and killed actress Rebecca Schaeffer
at the front gate of her Los Angeles apartment.' Soon thereafter, in
unrelated incidents, five Orange County women were slain at the hands
of their intimate partners.2 All of the killings shared two common at-
1. Fred Leeson, Inside the Mind of a Star Stalker, Crimebeat 20, 25-26 (Apr. 1992).
2. James Quinn, Man Pleads No Contest in 'Stalking' Case, L.A. Times B3, B5 (July 23,
1991); Rosalind Resnick, States Enact 'Stalking' Laws; California Takes Lead, Nat'1 L. J. 3 (May
11, 1992).
992 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:991
tributes: the killers had stalked their victims incessantly, and the jus-
tice system had been unable to intervene.3
Suddenly conscious of the inadequacy of current law, the California
legislature responded in 1990 by creating the nation's first stalking law."
The statute criminalizes the repeated harassment or following of an-
other person in conjunction with a threat. California is enforcing the
law aggressively.'
Thirty states have followed California's move and enacted stalking
laws.' The brutal killing of at least one woman in each state usually has
prompted the passage of these laws.8 Many of the statutes are identical
to the California law,9 but a few differ substantially in both scope and
language.10 Some target repeated harassment;" others target only literal
3. Rebecca Schaeffer's killer, Robert John Bardo, had written numerous letters and had
traveled from Tucson to Los Angeles three times in an attempt to communicate with the actress.
Leeson, Crimebeat at 22-24 (cited in note 1). All five of the Orange County women were harassed
and killed by boyfriends or ex-husbands, against whom they had obtained restraining orders.
Quinn, L.A. Times at B5 (cited in note 2).
4. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9 (West 1992).
5. Id. See notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
6. The Los Angeles Police Department has created a special group, the Threat Management
Unit, to handle stalking cases. The unit has investigated 178 cases and prosecuted 29, with a 100%
conviction rate. Telephone Interview with Officer Joseph Montes, Threat Management Unit, Los
Angeles Police Dept. (Jan. 7, 1993). See John C. Lane, Threat Management Fills Void in Police
Services, Police Chief 27 (Aug. 1992).
7. The total number of states with stalking laws, including California, is 31. See 1992 Ala.
Acts 675; Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9 (West 1992); 1992 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111; 1992 Conn. Pub.
Acts 237; 68 Del. Laws 250 (1992); 1992 Fla. Laws 208; 1992 Hawaii Sess. Laws 292; Idaho Code §
18-7905 (1992); 1992 Ill. Laws 871; 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 2025 (West); 1992 Kan. SB 358; 1992 Ky.
Rev. Stat. & Rules Serv. 443 (Baldwin); 1992 La. Acts 80; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 265, § 43 (Michie/
Law Co-op 1992); Mich. H.R. 5472 (1992); 1992 Miss. Laws 532; 1992 Neb. Laws 1098; 1992 N.J.
Laws 209; N.Y. Pen. Law § 240.25 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993); 1992 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
804; Ohio HR 536 (1992); Okla. SB 667 (1992); 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 201; 1992 S.C. Acts & Resol.
417; S.D. Cod. Laws § 22-19(A)-i (1992); 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts 795; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5
(1992); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-60.3 (1992); 1992 Wash. Laws 186; W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(a) (1992);
Wis. Stat. § 947.013 (1989-90) (amended by 1991 Wis. Act 194).
8. Melinda Beck, Murderous Obsession, Newsweek 60 (July 13, 1992). See, for example,
M.E. Malone, Assaults on Women, Problems, Prevention, Boston Globe 17 (Feb. 21, 1992); Eliza-
beth Ross, Problem of Men Stalking Women Spurs New Laws, Christian Sci. Mon. 6 (June 11,
1992); Man Charged with Murder Soon After New Law Bans It, Hartford Courant Cl, (Oct. 2,
1992); John W. Fountain and Joseph Kirby, Stalking Victims Find Laws Are Little Help, Chi.
Trib. ID (Aug. 5, 1992).
9. See, for example, Del. Laws 250 (1992); 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 201; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5 (1992).
10. See, for example, Mich. H.R. 5472 (1992); W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(a) (1992).
11. See, for example, 1992 Fla. Laws 208.
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stalking, such as following and surveillance."2 Some require a threat,"
others only conduct.' Further differences abound.
No stalking statute has faced a constitutional challenge at the ap-
pellate level.' 5 Yet, since their inception, the statutes have been the
source of much controversy. Civil libertarians claim that stalking laws
contravene the Constitution by making criminal and innocent behavior
indistinguishable and by infringing on First Amendment rights. 6
Others criticize the statutes as a politically safe shortcut that legislators
have adopted to address a pervasive crisis too complex for a single
law. 
7
In October 1992, Congress recognized the need for comprehensive
stalking legislation that will pass constitutional muster, and it enacted a
law charging the National Institute of Justice with the duty of drafting
a model stalking law.' 8 The Institute has one year from the law's enact-
ment to research and develop the model law, which will serve as a guide
for states wishing to enact stalking legislation or to solidify their cur-
rent stalking laws.' 9 Meanwhile, states continue to enact and enforce
their own stalking laws.20
This Note will analyze the language and scope of stalking laws and
various aspects of their constitutionality. Part II discusses the nature of
12. See, for example, 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 237.
13. See, for example, Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9; 1992 IM. Laws 871.
14. See, for example, 1992 Fla. Laws 208; Conn. Pub. Acts 237; Idaho Code § 18-7905 (1992);
1992 Hawaii Sess. Laws 292.
15. Nightline: Anti-Stalker Laws (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992) (available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File) (hereinafter Nightline).
16. See, for example, Gera-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws Proliferate, A.B.A. J. 35 (Nov. 1992)
(declaring that stalking laws are void for vagueness); Resnick, Nat'l L. J. at 3 (cited in note 2)
(quoting Jeffrey Weiner of Miami's Weiner, Robbins, Tunkey & Ross, stating that stalking laws
"will not pass constitutional muster"); Sonya Live: Stalker Laws (CNN television broadcast, June
8, 1992) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File) (concluding that stalking laws could possi-
bly be used against political dissidents); Sonya Live: Stalking (CNN television broadcast, October
2, 1992) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File) (declaring that stalking laws have the
propensity to be abused).
17. See Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking, USA Today 9A (July 21,
1992) (quoting Phil Gutis of the ACLU, stating "[ilt allows the governors and legislatures to say,
'We did something,' and it doesn't cost them anything"); Nightline (cited in note 15) (airing the
statement of Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington University: "[L]egislators want a sil-
ver bullet, and to be able to say, 'I got rid of stalking overnight.' That's not going to happen.").
18. Pub. L. No. 102-395 (1992). The law directs the Attorney General to develop a model
stalking law through the National Institute of Justice, the criminal law research arm of the Justice
Department. Id.
19. Id. The law is to be sufficiently broad to proscribe stalking behavior effectively, yet nar-
row enough to survive a constitutional challenge. Anti-Stalking Legislation, 1992: Hearings on
S.2922 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (hereinafter Hearings)
(unpublished statement of Maine Senator William S. Cohen, available from Senator Cohen's of-
fice). Senator Cohen sponsored the stalking bill.
20. See, for example, Mich. H.R. 5472 (1992).
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stalking behavior and the past failures of the legal system to address it
adequately. Part III analyzes stalking laws that various states have en-
acted, focusing on the California, Florida, and Connecticut statutes as
representative examples. In Part IV, this Note addresses potential con-
stitutional challenges to stalking statutes. 1 First, it analyzes whether
the statutes violate substantive due process by creating criminal liabil-
ity before the stalker has demonstrated culpability. It concludes that
the statutes are constitutional under this aspect of substantive due pro-
cess. Second, it addresses the constitutionality of stalking laws under
the void for vagueness doctrine, concluding that some stalking statutes
are unconstitutionally vague while others survive vagueness scrutiny.
Part V proposes a model stalking statute that circumvents many of the
vagueness problems present in current stalking laws. This Note con-
cludes in Part VI with a call for states to enact comprehensive, effective
stalking laws that meet constitutional requirements.
II. THE NATURE OF STALKING BEHAVIOR AND THE INADEQUACY OF
TRADITIONAL LAW
Stalking22 behavior varies widely in both its intensity and form.
Some cases involve threatening and unceasing harassment;23 other cases
involve voluminous mailings of unsolicited love letters coupled with
constant following;2 4 still other instances consist of merely incessant fol-
lowing and surveillance. 5 Most of the victims are women, although
sometimes men are targets. 6
21. This Note will not address First Amendment issues attached to stalking laws. It also will
not address the overbreadth doctrine in depth, though potential overbreadth problems will be dis-
cussed when they are extremely obvious or important to the constitutionality of the model statute
proposed in this Note. In addition, this Note will not address the constitutionality of warrantless
arrest provisions or bail provisions sometimes contained in stalking statutes.
22. This article defines stalking as obsessive, repeated harassment-a series of minor intru-
sions that together show a pattern of malicious behavior directed at a specific individual. See gen-
erally Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 Va. L. Rev. 507 (1984). Stalking statutes,
however, vary in how they define stalking. See notes 85-93, 105-12, 135-41 and accompanying text.
23. See, for example, Michael Connelly, Ex-Boyfriend Jailed Under 'Stalking' Law, L.A.
Times B1 (June 10, 1991).
24. See, for example, Park Elliot Dietz, Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to
Hollywood Celebrities, J. Forensic Sciences 185 (Jan. 1991). This condition is known as "erotoma-
nia." Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 512 n.14 (cited in note 22). See note 35 and accompanying text.
25. See, for example, Constance L. Hays, If That Man Is Following Her, Connecticut Plans
to Follow Him, N.Y. Times B1 (June 5, 1992).
26. See Women Ask Congress to Protect Victims of Stalkers, Reuters (Sept. 29, 1992) (quot-
ing testimony of Senator Joseph Biden, stating that most victims are women). John Lennon,
Michael Jackson, and David Letterman are examples of men who have been stalked. Leeson,
Crimebeat at 23-24 (cited in note 1).
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Comprehensive data on stalking does not exist, since stalking has
been classified as a crime category only recently.27 Studies predict that
about five percent of women in the general population will be victims of
stalking sometime in their lives.28 Even though much of the attention
accorded to stalking focuses on the harassment of celebrities by ob-
sessed fans, 9 statistics from Los Angeles show celebrity stalking there
to comprise only seventeen percent of stalking as a whole.30 Most vic-
tims of stalking are ordinary people, 31 and a great deal of stalking is
related to domestic violence and former intimate relationships gone
awry. 32
Stalkers themselves seem to fit no general profile, 3  but many ap-
pear to have a mental disorder.3 4 Some suffer from erotomania, a love
obsession with a stranger who is usually of a higher class or is more
successful than the stalker.3 5 Many others harbor abandonment rage, a
condition arising when the stalker is unable to process the hurt of a
broken relationship.3 6 Researchers estimate that approximately 200,000
people in the country stalk someone each year,3 7 and this figure seems
to be rising.38
27. Beck, Newsweek at 60 (cited in note 8).
28. Puente, USA Today at 9A (cited in note 17).
29. For example, celebrity stalking is the only type of stalking that commentators have stud-
ied in depth. Id.
30. Statistics from Los Angeles show that stalking victims consist of 17% highly recognizable
celebrities, 32% lesser known entertainment figures, 13% former employers or other professionals,
and 38% other people. Id.
31. Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of Senator William Cohen).
32. Ninety percent of women killed by husbands or boyfriends have been stalked. See Beck,
Newsweek at 60 (cited in note 8). Figures from Los Angeles show that at least 47% of stalkers
know their victims. See Puente, USA Today at 9A (cited in note 17). See also Hearings (cited in
note 19) (statement of Charles B. DeWitt, Director of the National Institute of Justice) (stating
that family members and neighbors are most at risk from stalking behavior); Nightline (cited in
note 15) (citing 1991 Justice Department statistics that 76% of violence against women is carried
out by husbands/ex-husbands or boyfriends/ex-boyfriends).
33. Stalkers appear to come from all backgrounds, ethnic groups, and social classes. Cheryl
Laird, Stalking; Laws Confront Obsession That Turns Fear into Terror and Brings Nightmares to
Life, Houston Chron. 1 (May 17, 1992).
34. More than 90% of those engaged in celebrity stalking, the only type studied in depth,
suffer from mental disorders. Puente, USA Today at 9A (cited in note 17).
35. The stalker usually has the deluded belief that the victim is in love with the stalker. See
Kiley Armstrong, Hate Abounds in the Name of Love, Chi. Trib. 8 (Nov. 23, 1992); Note, 70 Va. L.
Rev. at 512 n.14 (cited in note 22).
36. Armstrong, Chi. Trib. at 8 (cited in note 35) (quoting Dr. Reid Meloy, forensic
psychologist).
37. See Puente, USA Today at 9A (cited in note 17).
38. In the past 20 years, as many attacks on public figures by mentally disordered people
have been made as occurred in the preceding 175 years. Lane, Police Chief at 27 (cited in note 6)
(quoting National Institute of Justice statistic). Domestic violence seems to be increasing, indicat-
ing that stalking, which is closely related, also is increasing. In Massachusetts, for example, the
number of women killed by current or former husbands and boyfriends has tripled in two years.
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Victims suffer substantial and lasting emotional injuries from their
ordeal. 9 The greater danger, however, is that the obsession which stalk-
ing exposes is often a precursor to more violent crime.40 The stories are
numerous4 1 and the figures staggering. Thirteen hundred women per
year-nearly one-third of all women murdered each year-are slain at
the hands of their intimate partners," and ninety percent have been
stalked by their slayer.43 Further, rape and assault victims usually see
their attackers repeatedly before the crime occurs.4
The inability of the justice system to intervene in this type of ob-
sessive harassment is unsettling. Ninety percent of women slain by
their intimate partners have called the police at least once; fifty percent
have called five times or more.45 One-fifth of all women murdered have
been attacked previously by their killer.'6 State authorities inform those
victims of stalking who seek legal protection that the legal system will
not intervene until the perpetrator has "done something" or harmed
them physically.47 Victims question how far stalkers must go before the
law will intervene: "What must he do? Kill me? Rape me?' 4  Many
Colman McCarthy, Better Protection for Women in Danger, Wash. Post A3 (June 13, 1992). See
also News Release, Mass. Off. Att'y Gen. 3 (March 30, 1992) (Massachusetts Attorney General
Scott Harshbarger testifying before the Massachusetts Joint Committee on Criminal Justice, stat-
ing that "domestic violence ... seems to be escalating in frequency and severity").
39. Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 513 n.24 (cited in note 22) (citing Linda M. Gunderson, Com-
ment, Criminal Penalties for Harassment, 9 Pac. L. J. 217, 219 (1978), stating that "[t]he results
of one study showed that women who received anonymous, obscene, or threatening telephone calls
exhibited more anxiety than those who had been victims of serious physical assaults and thefts").
See also Laird, Houston Chron. at 1 (cited in note 33).
40. See Beck, Newsweek at 60 (cited in note 8).
41. Hearings (cited in note 19) (testimony of Jane McAllister and Sandra Poland); Fountain
and Kirby, Chi. Trib. at 1D (cited in note 8).
42. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Rep. 11 (1986). See Ann Jones, Her Say:
Time to Get Tough on Violence, Chi. Trib. Wll (Apr. 5, 1992).
43. See Beck, Newsweek at 60 (cited in note 8); Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of
Sen. William Cohen); Joseph Kirby, Law Enforcement Takes a New Approach to Domestic Vio-
lence, Houston Chron. 3 (Aug. 23, 1992).
44. See Laird, Houston Chron. at Li (cited in note 33).
45. Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of Sen. William Cohen).
46. See Anti-Stalking Laws Considered by Virginia (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Mar. 10,
1992) (available on LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File).
47. Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of Sandra Poland). See Louise Palmer, Maine
Woman Stalked for Eight Years, States News Serv. (Sept. 29, 1992).
48. See Beck, Newsweek at 60 (cited in note 8) (quoting stalking victim as asking, "What
does he have to do-shoot me?); Palmer, States News Serv. (cited in note 47) (quoting Sandra
Poland testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, saying "What is the 'something' [police]
must wait for him to do? Kidnap [her]? Rape her? Kill her?").
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victims are forced to change their lifestyles drastically, or even to relo-
cate and change their names in order to escape their pursuers. 49
The law provides both civil and criminal means for addressing be-
havior such as stalking, but the traditional legal tools available, often
have proven inadequate.50 Civil remedies available to the victim include
common law actions for damages, such as trespass, assault, invasion of
privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 51 The victim may
opt instead for civil injunctive relief, such as a restraining order.52 But
all of these civil remedies are problematic. First, civil action requires
that the victim, rather than the justice system, actively pursue the
cause for relief. s This individual action is often expensive and can take
months.5 The cost alone may render civil aid inaccessible to those who
need help the most.5 5 Second, damage remedies are useless if the
stalker has little wealth or is insolvent. Injunctive remedies can be
equally useless depending on state requirements for issuance. Florida,
for example, requires a showing of two acts of violence before a court
may issue a restraining order.5 6 Third, violations of injunctive orders
may require the victim to return to court to have the order enforced,
and the resulting sanctions generally are light.57 Punishment is often
civil contempt, which courts can sometimes dismiss if the violator
agrees to right the wrong.58 Additionally, criminal contempt yields only
minor penalties. 59 Fourth, enforcement is lax, and violations are ram-
49. See, for example, Puente, USA Today at 9A (cited in note 17) (noting that one woman
has lived in hiding for six years to escape a stalker); Ross, Christian Sci. Mon. at 6 (cited in note 8)
(relating story that a woman was forced to move to escape her stalker).
50. For a detailed discussion of conventional legal remedies for harassment, see Note, 70 Va.
L. Rev. 507 (cited in note 22).
51. Id. at 516-22.
52. Id. For purposes of this Note, civil injunctions include protective orders, restraining or-
ders, and other similar court orders.
53. Id. at 514 (stating that victims must bear the initial cost of litigation, potentially increas-
ing their suffering); Kenneth R. Thomas, Anti-Stalking Statutes: State Legislation, Cong. Re-
search Serv. Rep. 5 (Aug. 25, 1992) (stating that victims are responsible for initiating civil
protection proceedings, proving case, obtaining a protection order, and then seeking sanctions for
violations).
54. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv. Rep. at 4-5 (cited in note 53) (observing that the victim
usually must hire a lawyer, pay court costs, and develop a case and that a protection order may
take months to obtain).
55. Id.
56. See Resnick, Nat'l L. J. at 3 (cited in note 2).
57. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv. Rep. at 5 (cited in note 53). See generally Finn, State-By-
State Guide to Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders, 14 Response 1 (1991).
58. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv. Rep. at 4-5 n.17 (cited in note 53) (noting that a violator
is released from jail if he agrees to comply with a court order or if judge allows him to 'undo'
behavior).
59. Sanctions rarely exceed six months incarceration. Id. at 5.
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pant.6 0 Often police do not know restraining orders are in effect, or they
fail to arrest those who violate such orders." Finally, the civil system
lacks adequate deterrence.2 Violence against the victim often occurs
while the court orders are in effect, 3 and police sometimes even find
written restraining orders with the bodies of murder victims who had
been stalked. 4Criminal sanctions are equally problematic. Harassment laws are
the most appropriate means for combatting stalking, but traditional
harassment law is not sufficiently comprehensive. In most states, har-
assment laws apply solely to telephone and verbal harassment.6 5 Only a
few states have provisions that criminalize the following of a person
with the intent to alarm or intimidate,6 6 or that prohibit engaging in
intentional conduct which alarms or harasses another .6  The courts of
some of the states with these provisions have found their statutes un-
constitutional.6 8 In addition, harassment laws fail to address repetitive,
obsessive behavior.6 9 Some statutes require that each act in a series of
acts against the same victim be proven as separate and distinct misde-
meanors.70 Subsequent offenses rarely are felonies,7 1 and the result is an
60. During a five month period in Illinois in 1992, citizens reported 35,346 violations of pro-
tection orders. Linda Mae Caristone, The Stalkers: 'Every Day Might Be My Last,' Chi. Trib. 3
(Sept. 13, 1992). In Massachusetts, 2000 restraining orders were issued between September and
December 1991, and over one-third were violated within the first few days. David Holnstrom,
Efforts to Protect Women from 'Stalkers' Gain Momentum at State, Federal Levels, Christian
Sci. Mon. 1 (Dec. 22, 1992).
61. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv. Rep. at 5 (cited in note 53). Police may not even have the
authority to arrest for violations of protection orders in states where the penalty is only civil con-
tempt. Id.
62. Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 521 (cited in note 22).
63. For example, in Massachusetts between January and June 1992, 19 women and children
were slain in domestic violence, and at least half had protective orders against their killers. Ross,
Christian Sci. Mon. at 6 (cited in note 8).
64. See, for example, Beck, Newsweek at 60 (cited in note 8) (relaying the story of police
finding a restraining order in the purse of a murdered stalking victim).
65. Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 523-25 (cited in note 22). See, for example, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 134,
§ 16.4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1986); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-285 (West 1986).
66. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2909, 2910 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111
(1978); N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 240.25-.30,.31 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993). See generally Note, 70 Va.
L. Rev. at 525, 537-44 (cited in note 22).
67. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2909, 2910 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111
(1978) (held unconstitutional in People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985)); N.Y. Pen. Law §§
240.25-.31 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993).
68. See, for example, Norman, 703 P.2d at 1261 (holding unconstitutional as void for vague-
ness the catch-all provision of a harassment statute).
69. Massachusetts Attorney General L. Scott Harshbarger has noted that current law leaves
a void in cases of "continuous, escalating and dangerous conduct." Beverly Ford, Officials Urge OK
for Anti-Stalker Bill, Boston Herald 10, 10 (Mar. 31, 1992).
70. Id. (quoting Massachusetts Attorney General L. Scott Harshbarger).
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endless cycle of misdemeanor charges insufficient to deter the stalker.7 2
Rather than delegitimizing the conduct,73 the statutes actually down-
play the significance of serious harassment and stalking.74 The stalker
must therefore "do something," such as physically attack the victim,
before the law will strongly intervene.75
Lack of understanding in the legal community about the nature of
obsessive behavior has contributed further to the inadequacy of legal
intervention.7 6 Some police departments do not view harassment and
stalking as serious, and the result is inadequate enforcement.77 Prosecu-
tors sometimes are hesitant to press for harassment convictions because
the punishment is too light to effect deterrence.7 8 Judges may give little
time on busy dockets to requests for restraining orders,7 9 perceiving
harassment as no more than a minor inconvenience for the victim.
0
The justice system as a whole, therefore, has failed to respond to
the problem of obsessive behavior. This phenomenon has combined
with the law's longstanding resistance to recognizing the seriousness
71. See Thomas, Cong. Research Serv. at 3 (cited in note 53); Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 526
(cited in note 22). See also Model Pen. Code § 250.4 (1980) (classifying harassment as a petty
misdemeanor).
72. Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 526 (cited in note 22).
73. Id. at 515, 526 n.103 (concluding that criminal sanctions tend to delegitimize behavior).
74. Id. at 526 n.103 (citing Johs Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 176, 192 (1952), stating that the severity of the sanction reflects society's
distaste for the behavior). The minor penalties that prior law imposed reflect a perception that
harassment is insignificant. Id. at 526.
75. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
76. Holmstrom, Christian Sci. Mon. at 1 (cited in note 60) (stating that the "judiciary [is]
inclined to see domestic violence not as a crime, but rather as a domestic issue").
77. See, for example, the tragedies of Riss v. New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968) (victim
Riss repeatedly begged police for help but police denied her assistance; her ex-boyfriend hired a
thug who threw lye in her face, permanently disfiguring her and partially blinding her); Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (victim Thurman's estranged husband
repeatedly threatened and attacked her; police refused to take action and her husband eventually
attacked her with a knife and stabbed her repeatedly).
78. Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 521 (cited in note 22).
79. See Patricia Nealon and Sean P. Murphy, Thwarting the Killers is Complex, Elusive
Goal, Boston Globe 1 (June 2, 1992) (quoting Jean Haertl, intervention worker in domestic vio-
lence cases, as stating that "[w]ith dwindling resources and overcrowded courtrooms, judges have'
no time to spend on [protective order] cases").
80. One judge, pressed for time, recently ordered mediation when the victim of an obscene
caller sued for an injunction. Mike Royko, Mediation Order Is an Obscene Call, Chi. Trib. 3 (Sept.
18, 1992). Observers accuse some judges of telling domestic violence victims to "work it out" with
their spouse. See Bella English, A Lifer's Story, a Mother's Plea, Boston Globe 27 (Aug. 19, 1992).
Ironically, Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, recently was indicted for
harassing and threatening his former girlfriend. Since their break-up a year ago, he allegedly has
made threatening phone calls and mailed sexually explicit letters. Associated Press, Judge Accused
of Threatening Ex-Girlfriend, L.A. Times A24 (Nov. 8, 1992).
1000 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:991
and tangibility of emotional harni.81 The general sentiment has been
that obsessive behavior that causes only mental anguish is not serious
conduct, and therefore it does not warrant a serious remedy.
All of these factors have created a gap in the law,8" leaving victims
of stalking without an adequate legal recourse against their pursuers.
Stalking laws represent a new attempt to fill this void and deal seri-
ously with the problems of obsessive harassment.8 3
III. THE NATURE OF STALKING LAWS
As the first law of its kind, the California stalking law has become a
model for other states enacting stalking legislation. The more recent
Florida and Connecticut stalking laws, although different, contain at-
tributes common in other stalking laws. The combined attributes of
these three laws are fairly representative of stalking laws as a whole.
A. The California Stalking Law: The Credible Threat Model
The California stalking law85 criminalizes intentional obsessive har-
81. Physical harm is perceived as much more tangible and real. The stringent requirements
once imposed for proving emotional harm in tort are illustrative. See, for example, Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896) (requiring that wrongful act cause physical injury before
emotional damages can be recovered); Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1970) (requiring
physical manifestations of emotional injury before allowing recovery).
82. See Ford, Boston Herald at 10 (cited in note 69) (quoting testimony of Massachusetts
Attorney General L. Scott Harshbarger that a stalking bill will fill a void in cases of continuous,
escalating conduct).
83. Id.
84. See note 9 and accompanying text.
85. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9. The statute reads in full:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person
and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of
death or great bodily injury is guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by imprisonment in
a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary restraining order or an
injunction, or both, in effect prohibiting the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the
same party, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment,
or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(c) A second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a prior conviction
under subdivision (a) against the same victim, and involving an act of violence or a "credible
threat" of violence, as defined in subdivision (e), is punishable by imprisonment in a county
jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or
by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(d) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and willful course of con-
duct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and
which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the person. "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed
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assment by someone who makes a credible threat.86 The statute has two
actus reus87 elements, each with separate intent requirements. First, the
statute requires willful, malicious, and repeated following or harass-
ment.88 "Harassment" is used as a catch-all term, in order to reach any
repeated intentional activity that a stalker may direct toward a victim.
The statute defines "harasses" as requiring a course of conduct, which
is a series of acts over a period of time that shows a continuity of pur-
pose.s9 No minimum time period is specified.90 The statute also does
not define "following," but rather assumes that its meaning is clear.
Second, the statute requires a "credible threat" that was intended to
cause the victim to reasonably fear death or great bodily injury.9 1 The
perpetrator must have the intent and apparent ability to carry out the
threat, and the victim must experience both subjective and objective
fear.92 The threat need not precede the other behavior.9 3
The statute excludes some constitutionally protected activity. For
example, labor picketing is specifically excluded from the statute's
reach.9 ' The statute also creates a general exclusion of constitutionally
of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of conduct."
(e) For purposes of this section, "a credible threat" means a threat made with the intent and
the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the
threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a
threat to cause great bodily injury to, a person as defined in Section 12022.7.
This section shall not apply to conduct which occurs during labor picketing.
86. Id.
87. "Actus reus" is the act requirement contained in criminal statutes. "Mens rea," used
later in this article, is the intent requirement.
88. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The statute requires that the stalker make, rather than merely pose, a credible threat.
Therefore, the statute seems to require a verbal or written threat, rather than mere threatening
conduct.
92. This seems to be required by the definition of "credible threat," but this definition is
subject to two different constructions. The provision can be construed to mean that the victim
must feel reasonable and actual harm, or that the stalker must intend that the victim experience
reasonable and actual harm. California has moved to amend the definition of credible threat to
include "any threat made in any manner or in any context which causes the person hearing or
receiving the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate
family." Cal. S.R. 1342 (1992). This proposed amendment will clarify the requirement that the
victim experience both reasonable and actual fear. The current definition probably was intended to
require this, because otherwise harassment, as defined in the statute, would require actual harm,
but following, which is undefined, would not. This seems unlikely, but compare the Florida statute
discussed in text accompanying notes 109-13.
93. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9. Compare 1992 Ill. Laws 871. See notes 158-59 and accompanying
text.
94. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9(e).
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protected activity through its definition of "harassment,"9 5 but it fails
to define "following" in a similar manner. Therefore, some constitution-
ally protected activity may fall within the statute's scope. 6
The statute makes a first offense punishable by incarceration for
up to one year in a county jail, or by a fine of not more than one thou-
sand dollars, or both. 7 When the stalker violates a restraining order or
injunction, or is convicted of a subsequent offense against the same vic-
tim within seven years, he may be incarcerated in a state prison.98 The
provisions regarding restraining orders and subsequent convictions re-
flect official recognition of the obsessive and continuing nature of the
conduct."'
The California statute criminalizes much of the obsessive harass-
ment that prior legislation failed to address. The statute reaches re-
peated intentional following where the stalker makes a threat with the
intent to cause the victim serious emotional harm. But the statute's
reach extends even further: if the stalker makes a threat, it proscribes
any repeated action that the stalker intends to, and that actually does,
cause the victim reasonably to fear bodily harm. The threat require-
ment places an outer limit on the reach of the statute and acts as a
threshold to ensure that serious intent is present.
Bodybuilder Mark Bleakley's recent stalking of Leslie Wein is an
example of the conduct that the California statute reaches. Bleakley be-
gan harassing Wein, his former girlfriend, after she ended their two-
95. The definition of "harassment" includes "course of conduct," which is defined to explic-
itly exclude constitutionally protected activity. A requirement that harassment have "no legitimate
purpose" also is an attempt to exclude constitutionally protected activity. Id. at § 646.9(d).
96. Critics fear that similar statutes may reach journalists or parents attempting to monitor
children of whom they have been denied custody. See Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of
Sen. William Cohen). See also Seth Schiesel, Federal Measure Would Bar Stalking, Boston Globe
5 (July 2, 1992). It is doubtful, however, that these parties, especially journalists, would fit the
other statutory requirements (such as making a threat with the intent to cause fear of serious
bodily injury or death).
97. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9.
98. Id. California has moved to increase the penalties for subsequent stalking offenses. Cal.
S.B. 1342 (1992). Currently, the statute's language seems to increase punishment for subsequent
offenses only by providing for incarceration in a state prison. Yet other sources indicate that pun-
ishment can be increased up to a maximum of three years: See id. See also James Quinn, 'Stalking'
Law Violator Jailed a 2nd Time; Court: First Man Sentenced Under New Harassment Statute
Was on Probation When He Went Looking for His Ex-Girlfriend, L.A. Times B3 (Mar. 18, 1992)
(stating that stalker Mark Bleakley was given a three-year sentence for subsequent offense). The
maximum punishment for subsequent offenses is therefore unclear.
99. This provision ensures that injunctions are taken seriously and that subsequent harass-
ment of the same victim is recognized as recidivism (habitual criminal behavior). Compare notes
60-64, 69-74 and accompanying text, and Robert J. Bender, Stalking Bill, Law Enforcement
Newsl. 15, 17 (Off. of the Att'y Gen. of Mass. and the Dist. Att'y for Essex Co., July 1992) (stating
that stalking laws recognize that harassment is repeated even if the offender does not repeat the
first type of conduct but changes to a different type of harassing conduct).
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year relationship.' 0 Bleakley called Wein's home tirelessly, hanging up
when the phone was answered. He also slashed tires and poured acid on
cars that Wein used, and eventually stole her collie, leaving photo-
graphs of the dog on cars outside of Wein's home.' 0 ' Yet no witnesses
could attest to Bleakley's acts until police were investigating damage to
Wein's car and spotted Bleakley nearby in violation of a restraining or-
der. 0 2 The next day, Bleakley phoned Wein at her office, saying, "I'm
not just coming after your possessions, you'll be the next thing dam-
aged.'10 3 A few days later, police observed Bleakley drive by Wein's
house four times, and they arrested him on stalking charges. Bleakley
was convicted of felony stalking. 04 He had intentionally threatened and
repeatedly harassed Wein, causing serious and reasonable emotional
distress, and the California stalking law provided strong criminal sanc-
tions before Bleakley could carry out a physical assault.
B. The Florida Stalking Law: The Two-Tiered, Non-Credible
Threat Model
The Florida stalking statute'0 5 is significantly broader than the
California law. Although most of the language is virtually identical, the
100. Quinn, L.A. Times at B3 (cited in note 98).
101. Id. The collie later was recovered unharmed. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. He was sentenced to seven months in a locked drug clinic, plus the five months he had
served while awaiting trial. He also was given five years probation and ordered to leave Wein alone.
Bleakley was allowed to leave the clinic for an afternoon, and immediately he went to the health
clinic where Wein was a member and began looking for her car in the parking lot. Id. He was
arrested again, and sentenced to the maximum three years in prison. Beck, Newsweek at 61 (cited
in note 8).
105. 1992 Fla. Laws 208. The pertinent part of the statute reads:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that
causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.
(b) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of "course of conduct." Such constitutionally pro-
tected activity includes picketing or other organized protests.
(c) "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent to cause the person who is the
target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life
of, or a threat to cause great bodily injury to, a person.
(2) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person
commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree ....
(3) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person,
and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or
bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree ....
(4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence ... or an in-
junction for protection against domestic violence ... or after any other court imposed prohibi-
tion of conduct toward the subject person or that person's property, knowingly, willfully,
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Florida statute does not require a credible threat for a stalking convic-
tion.108 Instead, it defines stalking as willful, malicious, and repeated
following or harassment. 10 7 It then creates a second offense for aggra-
vated stalking, which requires a credible threat or a violation of a court
order.10 8
Florida's stalking offense 0 9 requires that the stalker intend to in-
flict emotional harm on the victim." 0 But the stalking provision does
not require that the victim's fear be objectively reasonable.1 In addi-
tion, it requires subjective harm only in the definition of "harasses," so
following that constitutes stalking is criminal even if the victim is un-
harmed.11 2  These differences from the California statute greatly
broaden the scope of the Florida law. Thus, the Florida statute's reach
extends so far as to include intentional following that is intended to
cause harm but does not cause objectively reasonable harm, and does
not even cause subjective harm."'
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of aggra-
vated stalking, a felony of the third degree ....
(5) Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or she has
probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of this section.
106. Id. A number of other states have created offenses that do not require credible threats.
See, for example, Idaho Code § 18-7905 (1992); 1992 Hawaii ALS 292.
107. 1992 Fla. Laws 208 (cited in note 105).
108. Id.
109. In this Note "Florida's stalking offense" or "Florida's stalking provision" refers to the
lesser stalking offense, as distinguished from Florida's aggravated stalking provision.
110. 1992 Fla. Laws 208 (cited in note 105). The statute includes "malicious" in its mens rea
requirement. This probably requires that the stalker intend the injury which foreseeably results
from the behavior. See Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 856-61 (Foundation,
3d ed. 1982); Black's Law Dictionary at 958 (West, 6th ed. 1990) (defining "malicious"). When the
stalker harasses the victim, the statute requires that the victim suffer substantial emotional harm.
Therefore, "malicious" requires that the stalker intend that the victim suffer substantial emotional
harm, the foreseeable result of harassment. This Note will assume that "malicious" does require
that a stalker harassing a victim must intend to cause substantial emotional harm to the victim. If
"malicious" does not require an intent to harm the victim, however, the statute imposes strict
liability and may be unconstitutional. See note 163. When the stalker follows the victim, the stat-
ute does not require that the victim suffer subjective harm. Therefore, "malicious" requires for
following only that the stalker have the intent to cause some degree of emotional harm to the
victim. (Emotional harm, rather than any other kind of harm, is required because this is the only
type of harm that following-unaccompanied by an assault or other menacing behavior-can be
intended to cause). Thus, intent to cause annoyance or some other type of minor emotional harm
is sufficient.
Note the extreme scope of the statute if it does not require an intent to cause harm for harass-
ing or following: the statute would reach any intentional acts directed at a specific person that are
not intended to cause harm and that do not cause objectively reasonable harm; the statute also
would reach intentional following that is not intended to cause harm, does not cause objectively
reasonable harm, and does not even cause subjective harm.
111. 1992 Fla. Laws 208 (cited in note 105).
112. Id.
113. Objectively reasonable harm refers to harm that a reasonable person would suffer,
whereas subjective harm is the actual harm that a victim suffers.
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The aggravated stalking provision of the Florida statute differs
from the California stalking law in three notable ways. First, the aggra-
vated stalking provision defines "credible threat" as a threat made with
the intent to cause the victim reasonably to fear for her safety.
114 It
does not require intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat, as
does the California statute." Second, aggravated stalking does not re-
quire subjective fear where the stalker follows, rather than harasses, the
victim.116 Third, and most significantly, the Florida statute allows an
exception to the credible threat requirement of aggravated stalking
where the accused has committed the lesser stalking offense in knowing
violation of a court order. 117 In this situation, the statute creates crimi-
nal liability for aggravated stalking while reaching just as broadly as the
stalking provision. The statute is almost as narrow as the California
law, however, where a credible threat rather than a violation of a court
order yields aggravated stalking. The credible threat imposes require-
ments of objectively reasonable fear and an intent to cause fear. 1 8
Both the stalking and aggravated stalking provisions of the Florida
statute exclude some constitutionally protected activity. Yet like the
California law, the general exclusions are contained in the definition of
"harasses,"1 so constitutionally protected activity is not excluded
where the stalker follows the victim.1 20 The Florida statute has a spe-
cific exclusion for labor picketing and organized protests, but this ex-
ception also is contained in the definition of "harasses.
1 21
The Florida law makes stalking a misdemeanor.1 22 It makes aggra-
vated stalking a felony.12- By creating felony liability, the Florida stat-
ute breaks the endless cycle of misdemeanors that has rendered
traditional legal remedies ineffective against stalking behavior. 24 In or-
114. 1992 Fla. Laws 208 (cited in note 105).
115. Id. See note 92 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. Id. "Court order" here refers to any injunctions or similar orders requiring the stalker to
stay away from the victim. See note 99.
118. 1992 Fla. Laws 208 (cited in note 105).
119. Id. See note 85 and accompanying text.
120. See Thomas, Cong. Research Serv. Rep. at 6 (cited in note 53). This may make the
legislation unconstitutionally overbroad. For a concise discussion of overbreadth, see M. Sean
Royall, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory Precision,
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403, 1405-06 (1989).
121. 1992 Fla. Laws 208. The harassment definition also contains the phrase "no legitimate
purpose" in an attempt to exclude constitutionally protected activity. Id. See Model Pen. Code §
250.4 cmt.6 (1980).
122. 1992 Fla. Laws 208.
123. Id.
124. See note 72 and accompanying text.
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der to improve enforcement, the Florida law also authorizes warrantless
arrests of suspected stalkers if probable cause is present.125
Like the California statute, the Florida law reaches blatant stalking
conduct such as that in which stalker Mark Bleakley engaged. 126 But
the Florida law sweeps further than does the California law in critical
stalking cases that lie near the margins of criminal behavior. It reaches
cases where stalking consists only of conduct without a threat, such as
where an erotomaniac follows a victim incessantly but fails to commu-
nicate at all, or makes only obscene rather than overtly threatening
statements.12 Erin Tavegia's ordeal is an example of such conduct. 2 A
man began stalking Tavegia, now seventeen years old, when she was
only fifteen. 29 He would park outside her home, appearing at all hours
of the day and night. 30 He would slowly drive behind her as she walked
to and from school each day, sometimes offering her money to get in his
car, and often saying he would see her after school.' 3 ' Yet he never
made a threat or became sexually explicit when attempting to talk to
her. 32 The Florida stalking law reaches this behavior because Tavegia's
stalker followed her repeatedly with an apparent intent to cause emo-
tional harm. The Florida law also would reach the stalker if he had
harassed Tavegia repeatedly, rather than followed her, and had done so
with the intent to cause emotional harm. The Florida law creates imme-
diate criminal liability without requiring that the stalker physically at-
tack, or even overtly threaten, the victim. The California statute, on the
other hand, will not reach any of this conduct because the stalker has
not made a threat.' The Florida statute therefore addresses important
stalking cases that the California statute does not encompass. However,
both the Florida and California statutes require intent, so stalkers who
act out of deluded love rather than an intent to harm are excluded.' 3 4
125. The constitutionality of this provision is beyond the scope of this Note. For a reasoned
opinion concerning warrantless arrest provisions, see Opinion of the Attorney General of Ken-
tucky, OAG 92-96, 1992 Op. Att'y Gen. Ky. LEXIS 91 (June 12, 1992).
126. See text accompanying notes 100-04. Bleakley threatened, repeatedly harassed, and
caused reasonable and substantial emotional distress to his victim. These actions constitute aggra-
vated stalking under the Florida law.
127. See, for example, notes 23-24 and accompanying text.




132. Sonya Live: Stalker Laws (cited in note 16). Police were unable to do anything more
than arrest him for disturbing the peace. Id.
133. See Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of Sen. William Cohen).
134. Arguably, when a threat or conduct as frightening and persistent as that of Tavegia's
stalker is involved, intent seems obvious, so a defendant may have to argue insanity (or possibly
diminished capacity) to prove lack of intent.
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C. The Connecticut Stalking Law: The Literal Stalking, Non-
Credible Threat Model
The Connecticut stalking statute' differs dramatically from both
the California and Florida laws, for it addresses only literal stalking be-
havior rather than obsessive harassment in general. The Connecticut
statute criminalizes willful and repeated following or lying in wait.'36
Unlike the California and Florida statutes, it does not reach miscellane-
ous, repeated, and intentional behavior that harms a victim. 137
The Connecticut statute does not require a credible threat, but re-
quires instead that the stalker harbor the intent to cause the victim to
fear for her physical safety. 38 In this respect, it is a hybrid between the
California and Florida statutes. Like California, it requires an intent to
cause fear, yet like Florida it does not demand as a threshold require-
ment that the stalker make a credible threat. In this aspect the statute
is broader than the California law, but narrower than the Florida law.' 9
The Connecticut statute requires in all cases that the victim expe-
rience both subjective and objective fear, 40 which narrows its scope in a
similar manner to the California law. Unlike both the California and
Florida statutes, however, the Connecticut law does not exclude First
Amendment activity from its proscriptions.14 1
135. 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 237. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Section 1. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the
second degree as provided in section 2 of this act and (1) he has previously been convicted of
this section or section 2 of this act, or (2) such conduct violates a court order in effect at the
time of the offense, or (3) the other person is under sixteen years of age.
(b) Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.
Section 2. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when, with intent to cause
another person to fear for his physical safety, he willfully and repeatedly follows or lies in
wait for such other person and causes such other person to reasonably fear for his physical
safety.
(b) Stalking in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
136. Id.
137. Id. A few states have enacted stalking laws of this type. See, for example, 1992 Ill. Laws
871 (criminalizing only surveillance or following, which must be preceded by a threat); 1992 Hawaii
Sess. Laws 292 (criminalizing pursuing or conducting surveillance of another person only).
138. 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 237.
139. Where the Florida law requires an intent to cause substantial emotional distress, the
Connecticut and Florida laws are equivalent. This is because substantial emotional distress is the
intended result of causing someone to fear. Therefore, an intent to cause someone to fear is virtu-
ally equivalent to an intent to cause someone to suffer substantial emotional distress. See note 110.
However, the Florida law only requires an intent to cause some degree of emotional distress (for
example, annoyance), rather than substantial emotional distress, when the stalker follows the vic-
tim. This is a lesser quantum of intent than the intent to cause fear that the Connecticut statute
requires, and, therefore, the Connecticut statute is narrower. 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 237.
140. Id.
141. Id. The Connecticut statute addresses only following or lying in wait accompanied by an
intent to create fear of physical injury. Arguably, no First Amendment activity would fit this
description.
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The Connecticut statute creates an elevated stalking offense when
the accused has violated a court order, or previously has been convicted
of stalking, or when the victim is less than sixteen years old.142 Stalking
is a misdemeanor, while conduct falling within the elevated provision is
a felony.143 Connecticut's elevated offense primarily is an attempt to
circumvent the problems that prior laws faced in addressing stalking.
44
This elevated offense is similar to Florida's aggravated stalking provi-
sion, but the Florida provision goes further to permit increased criminal
liability based on the egregiousness of the stalking conduct itself.
145
The Connecticut statute is narrower than both the California and
Florida laws because it addresses only literal stalking behavior, which is
a subcategory of obsessive harassment.1 46 For example, the Connecticut
statute would not criminalize most of stalker Mark Bleakley's harass-
ment of Leslie Wein.1 47 It would reach only Bleakley's shadowing of
Wein, and his surveillance of her house and health club. It would not
address the repeated ringing of her phone and the vandalizing of her
cars. Yet in cases of literal stalking, such as that directed at victim Erin
Tavegia, 148 the Connecticut statute reaches more activity than does the
California law. As long as a stalker intends to cause fear to the victim,
the Connecticut statute, without requiring an overt threat, provides
criminal liability for following another person.1 4e The Florida statute
reaches this same activity, but the Connecticut statute is more limited
because it requires objective and subjective fear on the part of the
victim. 150
Like the Florida and California statutes, the Connecticut statute
only reaches stalking behavior that is intended to cause emotional harm
to the victim.15' Therefore, erotomaniacs who pursue a person out of
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The provision punishes recidivism (habitual criminal behavior) and puts teeth back into
restraining orders. It also provides felony penalties, breaking the cycle of misdemeanors that ren-
dered prior laws inadequate. See notes 65-74 and accompanying text. The recognition of the vic-
tim's age is curious and unique-no evidence available to this author suggests that minors are
more often the victims of stalking than are women in general.
145. For instance, aggravated stalking is constituted under the Florida law if the stalker
makes a threat in addition to following the victim. See text accompanying note 108.
146. See note 22 (defining "obsessive harassment").
147. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
148. See text accompanying notes 128-32. Tavegia was only 15 when the stalking conduct
began; so the Connecticut statute would elevate the conduct to first degree stalking and provide a
felony penalty.
149. See note 135.
150. Id.
151. See note 134 and accompanying text.
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deluded love and yet harbor no intent to cause emotional harm are ex-
cluded from the statute.
152
D. Significant Variations in Other Stalking Laws
The language of stalking laws from other states, although similar to
the California, Florida, and Connecticut statutes, often contains omis-
sions and variations that significantly alter the scope of these laws. A
number of examples will illustrate this point. The West Virginia stalk-
ing statute153 is extremely narrow. It only addresses stalking that is con-
ducted by someone with whom the victim "formerly resided or
cohabited or... engaged in a sexual or intimate relationship." 54 Stalk-
ing by a stranger or acquaintance therefore does not fall within the pur-
view of the statute. The Virginia law, 55 in contrast, defines stalking
broadly as "engag[ing] in conduct with the intent to cause emotional
distress.' 56 This statute does not define the conduct. Therefore, con-
duct may include virtually anything that causes distress. The only lim-
its are that the conduct must occur on more than one occasion and the
fear must be reasonable. 57 The Illinois statute55 defines stalking so
that a credible threat must precede the harassment and following. 59
Obsessive behavior that frightens the victim but occurs prior to a threat
is outside the scope of the statute.
Stalking statutes also differ in specific mens rea requirements. Ha-
waii, for example, allows for stalking convictions when the perpetrator
has a mens rea of only reckless disregard, rather than purpose or knowl-
edge. 16° A new Michigan statute,' 6' designed to reach all stalking behav-
ior, including that of erotomaniacs, does not require that the stalker
intend to harm the victim.6 2 Thus, the Michigan statute may permit
strict liability convictions. 63
152. Id.
153. W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(a) (1992).
154. Id.
155. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-60.3 (1992).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 1992 Ill. Laws 871.
159. Id. See also Caristone, Chi. Trib. at 3 (cited in note 60) (stating that the stalker must
threaten first).
160. 1992 Hawaii Sess. Laws 292.
161. Mich. H.R. 5472 (1992).
162. The statute requires that a stalker act willfully, but it does not require that the stalker
intend to harm the victim. Id. The statute was drafted based on victims' needs, and it attempts to
encompass all harassment and following that causes the victim to have reasonable fear. Id. See
Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of Michigan State Representative Perry Bullard).
163. See Mich. H.R. 5472 (1992). Most stalking laws only punish when either subjective or
objective harm is present. Therefore, the wrongfulness of the conduct that they address is the
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STALKING LAWS
A. Classifying Stalking Laws: Inchoate or Completed Offenses?
Many legislators claim that the purpose of stalking laws is to pre-
vent violence before it happens."' This suggests that stalking laws pun-
ish based on the potential of future harm, much like inchoate crime
laws.1 . 5 If stalking laws do address future harm, substantive due process
requires that they create criminal liability only once the defendant has
demonstrated culpability adequately. 6 This raises two issues. First, do
stalking laws punish for future harm? Second, if the laws do punish for
future harm, are they consistent with culpability requirements of sub-
stantive due process? Because this Note finds that stalking laws do not
address future harm, it does not reach the second inquiry.
The law provides inchoate offenses that authorize intervention
based on future harm. 6 7 If stalking laws also punish based on future
harm, they should share many of the attributes of inchoate crimes. But
they do not. Inchoate crimes, such as attempt and conspiracy, require
an intent to commit a secondary, or "target," crime and they require an
act that is part of the commission of that secondary offense. 6 8 Inchoate
crimes also create criminal liability without the necessity of manifest
harm caused to the victim. See notes 164-78 and accompanying text. If a stalking law requires only
an intent to follow or harass another, it creates a strict liability offense, because the statute pun-
ishes for substantial emotional harm done to the victim but does not require that the stalker in-
tend this harm. Strict liability offenses rarely are constitutional. See United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); People v. Hutchison, 361 N.E.2d
328 (Il. App. 1977).
164. See, for example, Rick Pluta, Anti-Stalking Bill Clears House Panel, UPI (Sept. 15,
1992) (quoting Michigan State Senator Perry Bullard, saying the aim "is stopping activity before a
physical and emotional harm occurs"). See also Quinn, L.A. Times at B3 (cited in note 2) (quoting
Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Andrew W. Diamond, as stating that statute is a "helpful
tool because it allows us to intercede before actual harm comes to a victim").
165. Inchoate crimes include attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. They allow intervention
before the completion of a crime based on a demonstrated intent to commit the crime and to cause
future harm. See Jordan Berns, Comment, Is There Something Suspicious About the Constitu-
tionality of Loitering Laws?, 50 Ohio St. L. J. 717, 720-22 (1989).
166. Substantive due process stems from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution. See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 2.12 at 148 n.1 (West, 2d
ed. 1986). It operates as a limit on the police power of the states and determines that some con-
duct, because of its nature, cannot be proscribed or regulated. Id. Substantive due process also
requires that criminal statutes contain necessary elements such as mens rea and an act or omis-
sion. Id. at 149. See Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) (setting forth the act
requirement). This last requirement ensures that statutes do not punish before the defendant has
exhibited criminal culpability.
167. See note 165 and accompanying text.
168. For example, attempted murder requires an intent to kill and an act that is a step to-
ward the killing. See Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law at 611 (cited in note 110).
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injury. 69 Stalking laws, in contrast, do not point to a specific secondary
offense. They intervene before a stalker's intent to commit a target
crime, such as murder or rape, can be identified. They require an intent
to stalk 170 and an act of stalking, 171 rather than an intent to commit a
secondary offense. In addition, stalking laws generally require manifest
harm.1 72 Stalking, therefore, is not an inchoate offense.
Instead, stalking laws achieve prevention by criminalizing acts
prior to the beginning of the commission of a secondary offense.1 3 Loi-
tering laws are conventional tools for achieving prevention in much the
same way. They criminalize presence when it is indicative of future
dangerous activity. 74 But unlike stalking laws, loitering laws generally
require intent to commit a secondary offense. 5 Loitering laws, there-
fore, only intervene when a target crime is identifiable but has not yet
been committed. 7 1 In addition, loitering laws create criminal liability
before a victim is identifiable and before harm has occurred. 77 Stalking
laws, on the other hand, create criminal liability only when a victim is
clearly identifiable and when harm has occurred. 78 Since loitering laws
address future harm, while stalking laws address only consummated
harm, stalking is not an intervention crime. Stalking offenses merely
appear to share the qualities of intervention crimes for three reasons.
169. For example, conspiracy and solicitation create criminal liability when illegal activity is
only imminent. Harm, therefore, has not necessarily occurred. See Berns, 50 Ohio St. L. J. at 721
(cited in note 165).
170. Stalking laws generally require an intent to injure the victim by following or harassing
her. See notes 85, 110, 136-38 and accompanying text. This is the equivalent of an intent to stalk.
171. See text accompanying notes 88, 107, 136.
172. When the stalker follows the victim, the Florida law's lesser offense does not require
actual harm. This is probably the result of careless drafting because the statute requires harm
when the stalker harasses. Regardless, the statute merely provides the equivalent of attempted
stalking; the law proscribes stalking when the stalker follows and attempts to cause harm to the
victim but is unsuccessful. See text accompanying note 112.
173. The statutes criminalize intentional following and harassment, which often precede the
more violent activity. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
174. See generally Berns, 50 Ohio St. L. J. 717 (cited in note 165).
175. Most loitering laws that are found constitutional require intent to commit a secondary
offense. See id. at 722-33. For example, a statute might punish for "loiter[ing] in or about any
toilet open to the public for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any
unlawful act." Id. at 730 (quoting from Cal. Pen. Code § 647(d)).
176. For example, the target crime from the loitering law cited in note 175 is "engaging in or
soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any unlawful act." Cal. Pen. Code § 647(d). The statute creates
liability when a person loiters for this purpose, although the person has not yet begun to engage or
solicit.
177. As in the previous two notes, the perpetrator is merely present in the bathroom for the
purpose of committing an unlawful act. The police do not need to identify a victim, because the
statute creates liability before the commission is begun.
178. See text accompanying notes 92, 140. The Florida stalking provision is an aberration
because it does not require harm if the stalker follows the victim. See text accompanying note 112.
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First, stalking laws attach serious penalties to actions that occur
early in an escalating series of events.7 9 Stalkers cannot commit more
serious offenses because they may be in prison as a result of their past
actions. This gives the illusion that stalking laws have intervened for
the purpose of preventing future harm; however, the laws merely have
punished for the past harm that a stalker caused. Just as incarceration
for a murder conviction prevents an offender from continuing to harm
others, so does incarceration for a stalking conviction prevent a stalker
from further harming his victim. Yet both convictions are based only
upon past demonstrations of culpability accompanied by consummated
injury.
Second, the law traditionally has perceived harassment as worthy
of only minor penalties. 180 Stalking laws, in contrast, prescribe major
penalties for harassment. This gives the appearance that they punish
for something more, such as the potential of future harm. In reality,
however, stalking laws simply reflect a new awareness of the seriousness
of harassment.' The laws prescribe punishment befitting the crime, a
task prior laws have failed to accomplish.' 82
Third, the current harm that stalking laws address is solely a prod-
uct of potential future harm. Stalking is wrongful because the threat of
future violence causes emotional injury to the victim.' If the likelihood
of future harm is great, then the present emotional harm is substantial.
Therefore, the injury stalking laws address is a function of future harm.
This gives the false impression that stalking laws address future injury.
For these reasons, stalking laws do not create intervention offenses.
They punish only for manifest harm that stems from completed acts.
Thus, they yield criminal liability only when culpability has been
demonstrated adequately, satisfying this substantive due process
requirement.
B. Void for Vagueness Challenges
The void for vagueness doctrine stems from the due process re-
quirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.8 It is a two-
pronged procedural concern imposed upon legislation. The first prong
focuses on notice and requires that "a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
179. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text
180. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the seriousness of harassment, see note 39 and accompanying text.
182. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
183. See note 39 (stating that victims of telephone harassment exhibit more anxiety than do
victims of physical assault).
184. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law § 2.3 at 90-91 (cited in note 166).
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what conduct is prohibited." 185 The second prong focuses on consis-
tency and requires that the law provide explicit standards to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."8 6 This second prong is the
most important determinant of vagueness.8 7
The Supreme Court has mitigated these weighty requirements by
recognizing that the law does not require impossible standards. 188
Words need not reach mathematical or scientific precision, 89 and courts
will uphold uncertain language when it is necessary for legislating in a
certain area of the law. 90 Sloppy draftsmanship, however, will fall prey
to the vagueness doctrine.' 19 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
found that a mens rea element to an offense will mitigate against vague-
ness, especially with regard to the notice prong.192 Yet when proscribed
conduct is not indicative of the requisite mens rea, a statute is uncon-
stitutionally vague because it allows law enforcement officials to have
too much discretion in distinguishing innocent from criminal
behavior.
193
One of the major criticisms of stalking laws is that the conduct
which these laws proscribe is innocuous, such that criminal and inno-
cent behavior are indistinguishable. 94 In addition, critics charge that
the statutes' language is unclear, creating the possibility of uneven
enforcement.'95
185. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). See LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law §
2.3 at 91-92.
186. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law § 2.3 at 94-95.
187. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58. See also Berns, 50 Ohio St. L. J. at 718 (cited in note 165).
An additional consideration is any "chilling effect" which a law may have on First Amendment
rights. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law § 2.3 at 96-97.
188. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
189. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); Bachowski v. Salamone, 407
N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis. 1987).
190. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law § 2.3 at 95 (citing Note, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 95
(1960)).
191. Id.
192. United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 35 (1963); Boyce Motor
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101
(1945). See generally LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law § 2.3 at 93-94.
193. This allows law enforcement officials to discriminate and results in unequal application
of the law. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163-64, 168 (1972). See also Berns,
50 Ohio St. L. J. at 719 (cited in note 165).
194. See Nightline (cited in note 15) (broadcasting Professor Jonathan Turley's statement
that the standard the laws created will make some legal behavior indistinguishable from some
criminal behavior).
195. See note 16 and accompanying text.
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1. The California Stalking Law: Void for Vagueness Issues When a
Credible Threat is Required
One major limitation of the California statute is the requirement of
a credible threat. The threat requirement demands that the stalker
demonstrate a serious intent to harm the victim. 9 ' However, the defini-
tion of "credible threat" is somewhat unclear. It requires "the intent
and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the per-
son who is the target ... to reasonably fear."197 "Intent" is subject to
two different constructions. The question is whether the stalker must
have the intent to carry out the threat, or merely the intent to cause
the person who is the target to harbor reasonable fear. The first re-
sponse does not seem plausible, because authorities cannot ascertain an
intent to carry out the threat until the stalker undertakes the commis-
sion of the threat. If the threat is to kill the victim, the stalker does not
have culpable intent to carry it out until he at least attempts murder.'98
Under this construction, then, the stalking statute does not provide
criminal liability until the stalker has acted to physically harm the vic-
tim; this is the same problem traditional statutes have faced in at-
tempting to address stalking behavior.'99 Under the second and more
likely construction, the stalker need only have the apparent ability to
carry out the threat and the intent to cause the victim to fear. The
statute then creates criminal liability before the stalker initiates a phys-
ical attack, as stalking statutes are intended to do.200
"Threat" itself is not vague. 20 1 And by requiring that a threat be
"credible," the statute further defines the meaning of "threat," rather
than making it ambiguous. 0 2 The threat provision strongly mitigates
against vagueness in the statute because it requires that the stalker
demonstrate a tangible intent to cause emotional harm. Therefore, the
threat requirement explicitly distinguishes innocent conduct from crim-
196. The stalker must intend the threat to cause the victim to fear great bodily injury or
death. See note 85.
197. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9(f). See also notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
198. Substantive due process requires at least an act before someone is considered culpable
and therefore criminally liable. See note 166 and accompanying text.
199. See text accompanying notes 47-49.
200. See note 164 and accompanying text (stating that the purpose is to intervene rather
than wait for stalker to "do something.")
201. See Armstrong v. Ellington, 312 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-26 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) (holding that
the word "threat" is not vague); Commonwealth v. Green, 429 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981). But see State v. Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d 397 (Neb. 1983).
202. Some argue that the credible threat provision makes the California statute too narrow
to address stalking effectively. See Hearings (cited in note 19) (statement of Sen. William Cohen).
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inal behavior. Terroristic threat statutes already proscribe such activity,
and they have survived vagueness challenges. 03
In addition to a threat, the California stalking statute is limited by
an act requirement of either following or harassment.2 04 The conduct
must be willful, intended to cause serious emotional harm, and re-
peated.20 5 The meaning of "following" seems obvious. But "harass-
ment" is much broader, requiring a course of conduct directed at the
victim that "seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses ... and which serves
no legitimate purpose."20 6 Courts have upheld "harass" in the face of
vagueness challenges. 20 7 But at least one court has found that the words
"annoy" and "alarm" are so broad that they provide no standard for
enforcement.20 s However, the stalking statute limits these terms by re-
quiring that a victim suffer substantial and reasonable emotional dis-
tress. 201 In addition, the stalker must repeat the conduct, and the
conduct must serve no legitimate purpose. 210 Furthermore, the credible
threat requirement restricts what conduct the statute reaches.
2 11 All of
these limits mitigate any ambiguity in the terms "annoy" and "alarm."
The statute clearly defines course of conduct and at least one court
has upheld the "course of conduct" phraseology, even when unde-
fined.21 2 The fact that the stalking statute defines "course of conduct"
further mitigates any vagueness concerns, but the definition does pre-
sent a problem. "Course of conduct" requires a series of acts occurring
over a period of time, but the statute sets no minimum time period. 213
Two separate acts only minutes apart thus may constitute a course of
conduct.214 This injects some degree of uncertainty into the statute, but
it may be a necessary evil to prohibit stalking behavior adequately.
21 5
203. Masson v. Slaton, 320 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Armstrong, 312 F. Supp. at 1119;
State v. Gunzelman, 502 P.2d 705 (Kan. 1972); Green, 429 A.2d at 1180. But see Hamilton, 340
N.W.2d at 397.
204. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
205. See note 88 and accompanying text.
206. Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9(e). See also note 89 and accompanying text.
207. Bachowski, 407 N.W.2d at 538-39; State v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 363 A.2d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
208. Norman, 703 P.2d at 1267. For a discussion of Norman, see text accompanying notes
237-42.
209. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, for example, Bachowski, 407 N.W.2d at 533. For a discussion of this case, see text
accompanying notes 231-36.
213. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
214. See, for example, Duncan, 363 A.2d at 803. This case found that a single encounter
constituted repeated harassment when the harasser was tenacious. Id. at 805.
215. See Model Pen. Code § 250.4 cmt. 6 (1980) (stating that it is impossible to define har-
assment more precisely). But see note 280 and accompanying text.
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Courts have upheld other statutes that do not specify a minimum time
frame.
216
In all instances, a requirement that the victim's fear be reasonable
limits the statute.2" In its definition of "harassment," the statute also
requires actual harm, and it probably demands the same in its defini-
tion of "credible threat."218
Utilizing all of these requirements, the California stalking statute
sets explicit standards for identifying stalking behavior and distinguish-
ing innocent from criminal conduct. The statute has some imperfect
language, but all of the pieces in sum create a well-defined perimeter.1 9
A stalker must threaten, follow, or harass repeatedly, and harbor an
intent to cause serious emotional harm. Harm must be actual and rea-
sonable. The California statute is narrow and specific, and therefore it
is not vague.
Furthermore, a statute substantially similar to the California stalk-
ing statute has survived a vagueness challenge. In Armstrong v. Elling-
ton,220 a federal district court upheld a Tennessee law's provision that
made it a crime to prowl, ride, or walk for the purpose of terrorizing
any citizen. 22' The district court found that a threat or an act of vio-
lence is necessary to constitute "terrorizing. '222 It then found that the
term "terrorizing" is not vague, and the court therefore concluded that
this provision of the statute is constitutional.2 23
The Tennessee statute at issue in Armstrong proscribes threaten-
ing conduct when accompanied by a verbal threat and an intent to
cause fear.224 This provision is substantially similar to the California
stalking statute; thus, the California statute is not void for vagueness.
216. See, for example, Bachowski, 407 N.W.2d at 533; Duncan, 363 A.2d at 803.
217. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
218. See note 85, 92.
219. State court interpretations of the statute could extinguish any of these minor ambigui-
ties. Under the vagueness doctrine, statutes are not tested on their face, but as state courts have
construed them. LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law § 2.3 at 91 (cited in note 166).
220. 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
221. Id. at 1123 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2805 (1907)). The statute was enacted in 1907
and was aimed at preventing "Night Rider troubles." Id.
222. Id. at 1126.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1125-26.
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2. The Florida and Connecticut Stalking Laws: Void for Vagueness
Issues When No Credible Threat is Required
a. The Florida Stalking Law
Florida's stalking provision shares few of the limits that the Cali-
fornia stalking statute contains. 25 The Florida stalking provision pun-
ishes repeated, intentional, and malicious following when no subjective
or objective harm is present.26 But it provides no guidelines for distin-
guishing malicious following from innocent following. For example, as-
sume that A repeatedly follows B for no legitimate reason. The conduct
does not harm B, and the conduct would not harm the objectively rea-
sonable person. If A is following B with the intent to cause her emo-
tional harm, then A is criminally liable. But nothing indicates that A
has such intent. A has not caused emotional harm. A also has not
threatened B, indicating an intent to harm. Therefore, police officers,
prosecutors, and juries have no standards by which to determine that A
has violated the stalking statute. Whether certain conduct constitutes
stalking becomes a matter of discretion. Thus, this part of the Florida
stalking provision violates the second prong of the vagueness test.
The stalking of Erin Tavegia 2 7 is an example of conduct that the
Florida following provision reaches. But the Tavegia example does not
show the inherent vagueness present in the statute, because the
stalker's conduct falls well above the threshold that the statute creates.
Tavegia's stalker caused both reasonable and actual emotional distress,
and this coupled with the extreme persistance of the conduct gave a
clear indication of intent.22 18 The Florida statute is vague because it cap-
tures activity that is much less obvious than this, and provides no stan-
dards for distinguishing innocent from criminal behavior. That is, when
no reasonable or actual harm is present, it is difficult to determine the
existence of intent to harm and to define what constitutes stalking
conduct.
The Florida stalking provision also punishes for repeated, inten-
tional, and malicious harassment when subjective harm is present but
objective harm is not.229 Harassment is a "course of conduct" directed
at a victim that causes "substantial emotional distress.., and serves no
legitimate purpose."230 Two courts have addressed vagueness challenges
225. This section addresses Florida's stalking provision, rather than the aggravated stalking
provision.
226. See notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
227. See text accompanying notes 128-32.
228. Id.




to harassment statutes similar to this part of the Florida law. In
Bachowski v. Salamone,'3 1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court found consti-
tutional a harassment statute that criminalizes "engag[ing] in a course
of conduct or repeatedly commit[ting] acts which harass or intimidate
[another] person and which serve no legitimate purpose. "232 The re-




The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the words "harass" and "in-
timidate" have a clear meaning, and require more than mere annoying
behavior.3 4 It also found that the requirements of repetition, intent,
and no legitimate purpose provide clear standards for enforcement.
23 5
Noting that the conduct that the statute targeted defies a more specific
description, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the statute.3 6
In People v. Norman,2 3 7 however, the Colorado Supreme Court
struck down a harassment statute that criminalized "engag[ing] in con-
duct or repeatedly commit[ting] acts that alarm or seriously annoy an-
other person and that serve no legitimate purpose. '238 The mens rea
was an "intent to harass, annoy, or alarm.23 9 The Colorado Supreme
Court noted that the statute could encompass any conduct.240 It also
observed that the words "alarm" and "annoy" are so broad that only
personal discretion determines their meaning. 41 The Colorado Supreme
Court therefore found that the statute provided no limiting standards
and was unconstitutionally vague.
2 42
The harassment provision of the Florida stalking statute is similar
to the provision upheld in Bachowski. Both statutes require repeated
conduct that has no legitimate purpose. They also require an intent to
harass the victim. In addition, the statute in Bachowski requires that
the victim suffer harassment or intimidation. The Florida statute re-
quires that the victim suffer substantial emotional distress. These re-
quirements are equivalent, because stalking laws merely recognize that
when victims experience harassment they suffer emotional distress.
243
231. 407 N.W.2d'at 533.
232. Id. at 534 n.1.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 537.
235. Id. at 537-38.
236. Id. at 539.
237. 703 P.2d at 1261.
238. Id. at 1266.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1267.
241. Id. at 1266.
242. Id. at 1267. The holding of Norman is explained clearly in People v. McBurney, 750
P.2d 916, 918-19 (Colo. 1988).
243. See notes 110, 139.
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On the other hand, the Florida law can be distinguished from the
statute struck down in Norman. The Norman statute does not require
repeated conduct. It also does not require that the conduct cause sub-
stantial emotional harm; it merely requires that conduct annoy or
alarm. This threshold for harassment is much lower than the minimum
requirement for harassment in the Florida statute. Furthermore, the
Norman statute does not require an intent to harass, but merely an
intent to annoy or alarm. The Florida statute is therefore much more
specific than the statute struck down for vagueness in Norman.
Like the statute upheld in Bachowski, the harassment segment of
the Florida stalking provision provides explicit guidelines for distin-
guishing innocent from criminal behavior. It punishes only when the
stalker engages in repeated, intentional, and malicious conduct that
causes substantial harm to the victim and that has no other legitimate
purpose. Therefore, this part of the Florida statute is not vague. For
example, it reaches the conduct of Mark Bleakley even before he ver-
bally threatened Leslie Wein.2 " Once authorities could trace the ring-
ing of the phone and the car vandalism to Bleakley,2 45 the Florida
harassment provision would provide criminal liability. Bleakley's ac-
tions showed a continuity of purpose, and they caused actual fear. In
addition, Bleakley had no possible legitimate justification for his ac-
tions. The conduct indicated an intent to harm. The harassment provi-
sion of the Florida stalking offense, which punishes only once these
requirements have been met, is not vague.
Florida's aggravated stalking provision's requirement of a credible
threat is substantially similar to the California law's requirement.246
Therefore, it should survive a vagueness challenge for the same reasons
that the California statute would survive a challenge. 47 But when fol-
lowing or harassing that violates a court order constitutes aggravated
stalking, the statute does not share the limits of the California stat-
ute248 because a credible threat or reasonable harm need not accompany
the conduct. Repeatedly harassing the victim in conjunction with a vio-
lation of a court order still survives vagueness challenges, however, be-
cause it is virtually identical to harassment under the Florida stalking
provision,2 4 and the violation of the court order provides an even
stronger limit that differentiates innocent from criminal conduct. When
the stalker repeatedly follows the victim in conjunction with a violation
244. See text accompanying notes 100-04.
245. Id.
246. See text accompanying notes 114-18.
247. See text accompanying notes 196-224.
248. See note 117 and accompanying text.
249. See notes 229-45 and accompanying text.
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of a court order, Florida's aggravated stalking provision also survives
vagueness, because the willful violation of the court order gives some
concrete indication of an intent to emotionally harm the victim.
2 50
Therefore, Florida's aggravated stalking provision is not vague.
In conclusion, the Florida stalking provision is unconstitutionally
vague where it proscribes malicious following. However, it survives
vagueness scrutiny where it proscribes harassment. The aggravated
stalking provision also survives vagueness scrutiny.
b. The Connecticut Stalking Law
The Connecticut stalking statute proscribes repeated following or
lying in wait,251 similar to the unconstitutionally vague provision of the
Florida statute.2 2 But the Connecticut law requires an intent to cause
the victim to fear for physical safety, which is a higher threshold than
the intent to cause emotional harm that the Florida statute requires. In
addition, the Connecticut statute places well-defined limits on the con-
duct it addresses by requiring both reasonable and actual harm.253 The
Florida provision does not impose these requirements. Thus, the two
statutes produce markedly different results when they are applied to
the example utilized to analyze the Florida following provision.254
Again, assume A repeatedly follows B. Under the Connecticut statute,
B must actually fear for physical safety, and the reasonable person
must recognize that A's conduct is sufficient to cause that fear. If A has
the intent to cause B to fear physical injury, then A is criminally liable.
The reasonable and actual consequences of A's conduct, coupled with
the persistence of A's conduct, which shows it has a continuity of pur-
pose, indicate that A probably harbors an intent to cause B fear. There-
fore, the limits that the Connecticut statute imposes make innocent
conduct distinguishable from criminal behavior. Thus, the Connecticut
law sets standards that clearly define stalking.
The stalking of Erin Tavegia 25 5 is a good example of the conduct
that the Connecticut statute reaches. The man who stalked Tavegia in-
cessantly followed her, and he caused both objective and subjective
harm. This indicates that the stalker had intent to cause Tavegia to
fear for her safety and suffer emotional harm.2 56 The Florida following
250. Compare text accompanying notes 225-28, 251-57.
251. See notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
252. See text accompanying notes 225-28.-
253. See notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
254. See text accompanying note 226.
255. See notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
256. The stalker may not have had intent to cause emotional harm, but instead may have
been suffering from erotomania. If so, the statute would not reach his conduct. In cases when the
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provision is vague because it does not require at least this much.251 7 The
Connecticut statute requires this much indication of intent as a mini-
mum, and, therefore, it clearly distinguishes between innocent and
criminal behavior.
The Connecticut stalking law recognizes that certain conduct is
threatening and indicative of an intent to cause emotionally damaging
fear. The Bachowski court acknowledges precisely this concept.2 158 The
statute in Bachowski criminalized repeated conduct that the perpetra-
tor intended to harass or intimidate the victim and that the victim
found harassing or intimidating.2 59 The Wisconsin court upheld the
statute against the vagueness challenge,260 thereby recognizing that con-
duct which is intimidating can be sufficiently indicative of an intent to
cause emotional harm. The Connecticut stalking statute is even more
specific than was the harassment statute upheld in Bachowski. In addi-
tion to requiring actual injury and repeated conduct like that in
Bachowski,261 the Connecticut stalking statute also requires objectively
reasonable harm.6 2 Furthermore, the Connecticut law reaches only fol-
lowing or lying in wait,26 3 a much narrower set of activities than that
which the Bachowski statute reached.264 Therefore, the Connecticut
stalking statute provides explicit standards, and thus is not unconstitu-
tionally vague.
The Connecticut statute demonstrates that a stalking law which
punishes for following yet requires no credible threat can survive a
vagueness challenge. Such a result is contrary to that which Florida's
stalking provision suggests. 65
conduct is intended to harm or when the stalker suffers from erotomania, the conduct is highly
indicative of an intent to harm, and thus the statute is not vague in either case. Innocent conduct
is clearly distinguishable because it may not cause objective or subjective harm, or be tirelessly
repeated. In the event that some innocent conduct does meet these requirements, the defendant
should still be able to distinguish his conduct from criminal conduct by providing an explanation
which suggests that he is not mentally defective or that he is attempting to cause emotional harm.
The intent requirement then would exclude the innocent actor from the purview of the statute.
Mentally defective behavior that indicates intent and that appears to fall within the proscription
of the statute does not make the statute vague.
257. See notes 225-28 and accompanying text.




262. See notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
264. See notes 231-36 and accompanying text. The statute in Bachowski reached any re-
peated conduct.
265. See text accompanying notes 225-28.
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V. A MODEL STALKING STATUTE
The California, Florida, and Connecticut stalking statutes re-
present novel attempts to address stalking behavior, but all suffer from
significant shortcomings. The California stalking statute, although con-
stitutional, is too narrow to comprehensively address obsessive conduct
because it requires a threat. The statute excludes dangerous cases of
stalking, such as that directed at Erin Tavegia.66 The Florida statute,
on the other hand, reaches these important cases.2 67 Yet it is unconsti-
tutionally vague when it addresses stalking by following because it
places no limits on the conduct in order to distinguish innocent and
criminal behavior. 68 The Connecticut statute, although it constitution-
ally reaches dangerous cases of following, is too narrow because it ex-
cludes important cases of harassment.
269
Each of these laws, however, does have specific strengths. The Cali-
fornia statute constitutionally reaches both harassment and following,
and it supplies important language that virtually all stalking laws have
imitated in full or in part. 70 The Florida statute is significant because
it achieves a constitutional proscription of harassment without requir-
ing a credible threat.2'7 The Connecticut statute achieves a constitu-
tional proscription of dangerous following without requiring a threat.
2 72
The model statute that follows is primarily a composite of these
three stalking laws. It draws on the strengths of all while avoiding the
narrow scope or constitutional infirmities of each individual law. The
model law reaches all stalking conduct intended to cause emotional
harm; it proscribes both harassment and following, and does so without
requiring a threat.7 3 Yet the statute contains sufficient limitations to
ensure that it is neither vague nor overbroad.
Model Stalking Law
Section 1. Stalking:
(1) A person is guilty of stalking who willfully, maliciously, and repeat-
edly follows or harasses another person with the intent to cause that
person to suffer substantial emotional distress.
266. See note 133 and accompanying text. See Appendix, Figure 1.
267. See notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
268. See notes 225-28 and accompanying text. See Appendix, Figure 2.
269. See notes 146, 147 and accompanying text. See Appendix, Figure 3.
270. See notes 196-224 and accompanying text.
271. See notes 229-45 and accompanying text.
272. See notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
273. See Appendix, Figure 4.
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(2) Stalking is a misdemeanor punishable by incarceration for a maxi-
mum of one year or a fine of not more than $2000, or both.
(3) The sentencing court may order any person convicted under this
statute to be examined by one or more mental health professionals.
Section 2. Aggravated Stalking:
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated stalking who willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person with the intent to
cause that person to suffer substantial emotional distress and in addi-
tion meets any one of the following conditions:
(a) communicates a credible threat to that person with the intent
to cause him or her to fear great bodily injury or death, or
(b) knowingly violates a court order prohibiting behavior described
in Section 2(1) against the same victim, or
(c) has been previously convicted under Section 1(1) or under this
section within seven years against the same victim.
(2) Aggravated stalking is a felony.
(3) The sentencing court may order any person convicted under this
statute to be examined by one or more mental health professionals.
Section 3. Definitions:
(1) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes reasonable and substantial emotional dis-
tress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.
(2) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a se-
ries of acts occurring in separate encounters, evidencing a continuity of
purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the
definition of course of conduct.
(3) "Follows" means lying in wait for or following a specific person
which causes reasonable and substantial emotional distress in such per-
son and serves no legitimate purpose. Constitutionally protected activ-
ity is not included within the definition of following.
(4) "Credible Threat" means a threat made with the apparent ability to
carry it out which would cause a reasonable person to fear great bodily
injury or death. The victim must actually fear great bodily injury or
death.
Section 4. Severability:
The provisions of this statute are severable.
The model statute contains both stalking and aggravated stalking
provisions. Stalking requires repeated harassment or following engaged
in with an intent to cause substantial emotional harm. Because this
10231993]
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provision does not require a credible threat, it reaches important cases
of stalking, such as that conducted against Erin Tavegia 1 4 The aggra-
vated stalking provision provides felony sanctions when a stalker makes
a credible threat, violates a court order, or stalks the same victim after
previously having been convicted of stalking. This provision addresses
recidivism, much like the Connecticut and Florida elevated stalking
provisions. 5 In addition, it punishes more egregious behavior, such as
when the stalker makes a threat, with increased sanctions, similar to
the Florida aggravated stalking provision.
The model statute is not limited to literal stalking behavior. 77 By
its definition of "harassment" it reaches any repeated conduct the
stalker used to harm the victim emotionally. 78 This allows the statute
to punish behavior such as that of stalker Mark Bleakley.2 7 9 The stat-
ute's definition of "course of conduct," used to define "harassment,"
requires a series of acts that occur in separate encounters. This narrows
the statute and eliminates the possibility that a single encounter with a
tenacious harasser could constitute stalking, a problem present in other
statutes.280
When the stalker makes a threat, the model statute requires that
the stalker have the apparent ability to carry it out.2"' The definition of
"credible threat" is similar to the California statute, but the word "in-
tent" is dropped from the beginning of the definition in order to elimi-
nate the confusion that the two possible constructions of the California
definition created.28 2 The stalker still must intend that the threat cause
the victim to fear great bodily injury or death.
Both stalking and aggravated stalking in the model statute require
willful and malicious intent.283 In addition, the model statute requires
that the stalker harbor an intent to cause the victim to suffer substan-
tial emotional distress. 28 4 Similarly, the Florida stalking provision2 8 5 re-
274. See notes 127-32, 255 and accompanying text.
275. See note 144 and accompanying text.
276. See text accompanying note 145.
277. Compare notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
278. Compare notes 88, 89 and accompanying text.
279. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text. Compare notes 126, 146, 147 and accompany-
ing text.
280. See notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
281. See Model Statute Sec. 3(4).
282. See notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
283. See Model Statute Secs. 1(1) and 2(1).
284. One article has noted that intent to cause substantial emotional distress is the only
intent requirement that is not subject to some degree of vagueness or overbreadth. Terms such as
"annoy" and "harass" often are challenged. M. Sean Royall, Constitutionally Regulating Tele-
phone Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory Precision, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403, 1422 (1989).
285. See notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
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quires that a stalker who harasses a victim must act maliciously and
cause substantial emotional distress. 2 8 6 "Maliciously" requires that the
stalker intend the consequences of his action; therefore, the Florida
statute requires that the stalker possess the intent to cause the substan-
tial emotional distress. 8 7 The model statute requires this same intent,
but does so explicitly rather than relying on the definition of "mali-
cious," as does the Florida statute. The model statute thus demands the
same severity of intent that the harassment segment of the Florida
stalking provision requires. The California and Connecticut statutes
differ because they both require an intent to cause fear,288 while the
model statute and Florida statute merely recognize that substantial
emotional distress is the stalker's intended result of the fear, and there-
fore it is equivalent to the intent to cause fear. The model statute sim-
ply equates the mens rea with the ultimate effect of the conduct and
requires the same level of intent as these other stalking statutes.
Because the model law, like the California, Florida, and Connecti-
cut laws, requires that the stalker intend to cause the victim emotional
harm, it does not reach cases when the stalker acts out of deluded love
rather than an intention to harm.289 In order to reach these marginal
cases of erotomania, the model statute would have to impose strict lia-
bility, similar to the Michigan stalking statute.290 A court probably
would find such a result unconstitutional.29 Thus, a constitutional
stalking law cannot reach all obsessive behavior; injunctions or civil
commitment necessarily must address some stalking.2 92 The model
stalking law minimizes the need for these other options by comprehen-
sively proscribing as much stalking behavior as is constitutionally
permissible. 93
The model statute survives vagueness challenges because it places
serious limits on the behavior it reaches. The stalker must act repeat-
edly, with no legitimate purpose, and with an intent to cause the victim
substantial emotional harm. In all cases, the victim must suffer reasona-
ble and actual substantial emotional harm. When the stalker follows
286. Id.
287. See note 110 and accompanying text.
288. See notes 91, 138 and accompanying text.
289. See notes 134, 151, 152 and accompanying text.
290. See notes 161-63.
291. See note 163.
292. Congress recognized this in its bill charging the National Institute of Justice with de-
signing a model stalking law. The Institute is authorized to study and evaluate both mental health
commitment statutes and protection orders as they relate to the need to prevent stalking behavior.
See Cooperative Agreement to Develop Model State Anti-Stalking Law, U.S. Newswire (Dec. 23,
1992).
293. See Appendix, Figure 4.
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the victim, the statute contains all of the requirements present in the
Connecticut statute, which is not vague.29 5 The model statute con-
tains a further limitation that the conduct have no legitimate purpose.
When the stalker harasses the victim, the model law contains all of the
requirements present in the harassment part of the Florida stalking
provision,2 96 which survives vagueness scrutiny.297 The model statute is
more limited than this segment of the Florida law, however, because it
requires that harm be objectively reasonable. Therefore, both the fol-
lowing and harassment prongs of the model stalking provision survive
vagueness analysis.
The aggravated stalking provision of the model statute is even
more secure against vagueness challenges. It requires, in addition to all
the other limits of the statute, that the actor make a credible threat,
violate a restraining order or a similar court order, or demonstrate a
history of harassing the same victim. All of these requirements act as
additional standards to guide law enforcement in distinguishing inno-
cent from criminal behavior.2 98 Therefore, the aggravated stalking pro-
vision of the model law is not vague.
The model statute also survives overbreadth challenges. Constitu-
tionally protected activity is excluded from the statute in all cases be-
cause the exclusion is contained explicitly in both the definition of
"harasses" and the definition of "follows." Both definitions also contain
requirements that the acts serve "no legitimate purpose. "299
The stalking and aggravated stalking provisions are distinctly sepa-
rate in the statute. Independence ensures that a constitutional problem
invalidating one provision will not necessarily invalidate the other. The
section requiring severability further strengthens this separation.
The model statute provides misdemeanor sanctions for stalking
and sets a specific penalty. The statute makes aggravated stalking a fel-
ony, but does not set a specific punishment, leaving this to be deter-
mined flexibly by state felony penalties. The imposition of a felony
penalty ensures that egregious and recidivist conduct is met with seri-
294. See notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
295. See notes 251-64 and accompanying text.
296. See notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
297. See notes 229-45 and accompanying text.
298. Where the statute requires a credible threat, it is substantially the same as the Califor-
nia stalking law; therefore, it survives vagueness for the same reasons. See notes 196-224 and ac-
companying text.
299. These provisions ensure that the statute is not overbroad. Model Pen. Code § 250.4 cmt.
6 (1980). See Note, 70 Va. L. Rev. at 532 (cited in note 22); Bachowski, 407 N.W.2d at 539. In
addition, the statute insists on substantial emotional harm in both intent and effect. This require-
ment creates a higher threshold than words such as "annoying" or "alarming," which courts have
found overbroad. See Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975).
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ous sanctions, a task which prior harassment law has failed to
accomplish.300
The model statute also provides the court with the option of con-
ducting a mental health evaluation of an accused stalker. This reflects a
recognition of the mental defect that is often an element of stalking
behavior.3s°
VI. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of stalking statutes reflects a new awareness that
obsessive harassment is serious behavior warranting a serious remedy.
Stalking laws are an important addition to the legal arsenal, precisely
because they account for the nature of obsessive behavior and punish it
with adequate penalties. Yet current stalking laws are not comprehen-
sive. Some, like the California and Connecticut statutes, are too narrow
to address fully all dangerous stalking behavior. Others, like the Florida
statute, are drafted imprecisely and are susceptible to vagueness chal-
lenges. With stalking behavior on the rise, the need for states to enact
comprehensive and carefully drafted stalking laws that will pass consti-
tutional muster is paramount.
Robert A. Guy, Jr.*
300. See text accompanying notes 72-74.
301. This provision is extremely similar to a provision in a model statute proposed in Note,
70 Va. L. Rev. at 531-33 (cited in note 22). In addition, the Hawaii stalking statute allows a judge
to order counseling. 1992 Hawaii Sess. Laws 292.
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(Shaded areas indicate what types of stalking conduct the statutes
proscribe.)






































* The Connecticut Statute does not specifically address stalking that consists of intent + threat + conduct, but
it will reach this behavior because it reaches the lower threshold of intent + conduct.











FIGURE 3. CONNECTICUT STALKING STATUTE
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